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AND THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE POWER TO . . . : THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE  
D.C. CIRCUIT COURT’S PER CURIAM DECISION IN BAHLUL V. 
UNITED STATES 
Clarke D. Cotton* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today, Amagansett, New York is an attractive East Hampton 
neighborhood.1 A get-away for the rich and powerful, there are typically 
more vacationers than residents in the town at any given time.2 Among 
the many mansions that populate Amagansett is a historic Coast Guard 
station that sits just off Atlantic Avenue beach.3 In 1966 the station was 
moved to a private residence to protect and preserve its features.4 In 
2007, the station was moved back to its original spot off Atlantic 
Avenue beach and, now, is protected as a historical landmark.5 This is 
the station that Coast Guardsman John C. Cullen sprinted to in 1942 to 
warn of a most extraordinary finding: a group of Nazis had landed on 
American soil with explosives in hand, they were here to do our country 
harm.6  
Thirty-five miles outside of Berlin, Germany, laid a camp in which 
eight Nazi soldiers were trained in the use of explosives, fuses, and 
detonators.7  These men received their instruction from Lt. Walter 
Kappe and focused on destroying railroads, factories, and other strategic 
U.S. military and infrastructure targets.8 The eight soldiers were divided 
into two groups. The first was led by Edward John Kerling, and included 
Werner Thiel, Hermann Neubauer, and Herbert Hans Haupt.9 Kerling’s 
 
* Associate Member, 2016-2017, University of Cincinnati Law Review 
 1. John Rather, If You’re Thinking of Living in Amagansett, L.I.; A Down to Earth Hamptons 
Alternative, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/30/realestate/if-you-re-
thinking-living-amagansett-li-down-earth-hamptons-alternative.html. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Amagansett Life Saving Station (1902) East Hampton, New York, U.S. LIFE-SAVING SERVICE 
HERITAGE ASSOCIATION, http://uslife-savingservice.org/station/endangered-stations/amagansett-life-
saving-station-1902-east-hampton-ny/.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Richard Goldstein, John Cullen, Coast Guardsman Who Detected Spies, Dies at 90, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/03/nyregion/john-cullen-coast-guardsman-
who-detected-spies-dies-at-90.html. 
 7. LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31340, MILITARY TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN 
PRECEDENT 1 (2002). 
 8. Id. at 1. 
 9. Id. at 5.  
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group headed for the coast of Florida, and they arrived near Jacksonville 
without incident on June 16, 1942.10 The second group was led by 
George John Dasch, and included Earnest Peter Burger, Heinrich Harm 
Heinck, and Richard Quirin.11  Their group headed for New York City, 
and they arrived on the beaches of Amagansett on June 12, 1942, in full 
uniform and with explosives in tow.12 
The night of June 12 was particularly foggy when Coastguardsman 
Cullen began his beach patrol.13  Cullen, then twenty-one, had joined the 
Coast Guard a few weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.14  
He was assigned to one of the least glamorous tasks a Coastguardsman, 
or any U.S. serviceman, could be assigned: a “sand pounder.”15  
Essentially, a sand pounder was responsible for walking up and down 
the beach – pounding sand – and looking for signs of enemy submarines 
or planes.16  The job was boring and lonely, and sand pounders did not 
even carry weapons.17  
Not long after his patrol began, Cullen happened upon Dasch’s group 
digging in the sand.18 Dasch, whose English was quite good, explained 
that he and his friends were fishermen who had run aground.19  
However, one of the other men, dragging a large bag, shouted something 
in German. Seeing Cullen’s suspicion, Dasch abandoned his fisherman 
story and asked Cullen if he had parents who would grieve his death.20 
“I wouldn’t want to have to kill you,” said Dasch.21  
Instead, Dasch, perhaps considering the difficulties that murdering a 
service member would cause, offered Cullen $300, asking, “Why don’t 
you forget the whole thing?”22 Cullen quickly agreed, accepting the 
money, which he later counted to be only $260, and retreated back into 
the fog.23 However, once he was out of sight, Cullen sprinted back to the 
Coast Guard station to inform his superiors of his discovery.24 Cullen 
 
 10. Id. at 5.  
 11. Id. at 5.  
 12. Id. at 5.  
 13. Aileen Jacobson, Nazi Saboteurs in the Amagansett Sands, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/nyregion/june-13-1942-saboteurs-land-in-amagansett-on-view-in-
east-hampton.html?_r=0.  
 14. Goldstein, supra note 6.   
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Fisher, supra note 7, at 5; Jacobson, supra note 13. 
 19. Goldstein, supra note 6.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Fisher, supra note 7, at 5. 
 24. Jacobson, supra note 13.  
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and the Coastguardsmen recovered the buried explosives and contacted 
the FBI station in New York City, who then launched a massive 
manhunt.25 
The manhunt was short lived, however. On the night of June 14, 
Dasch decided to turn himself in to the FBI.26  Dasch called the New 
York headquarters, informed the desk agent that he was a Nazi, and told 
of his plans.27  For reasons that remain unclear, the desk agent did not 
appear to take these claims seriously.28  Dasch offered to travel to 
Washington D.C. and turn himself into FBI Headquarters.29  The FBI 
agent made a note of the phone call but never sent the memo to D.C. or 
asked Dasch to turn himself in in the New York office. It appeared that 
the agent was happy to take Dasch at his word, which luckily, Dasch 
kept.30 
As Dasch traveled to D.C., Kerling’s group arrived in Jacksonville, 
unbeknownst to the FBI. From there, the four Nazis traveled to 
Cincinnati, Ohio, staying a few days before splitting up.31  Two of the 
men traveled to Chicago while the other two went to New York.32     
Dasch arrived in D.C. on June 20, 1942, and turned himself in to 
authorities.33 Burger, who at the time knew of Dasch’s plans, waited in 
his hotel room and was arrested without incident.34  With the help of 
Dasch and Burger, the FBI located and arrested the other six Nazis and, 
by June 27, all eight saboteurs were in custody.35 
Originally, the Nazis were to be tried in federal court, but Attorney 
General Francis Biddle quickly discovered a problem: there were almost 
no charges that could be brought against the Nazis.36 Of course, they 
could be charged with sabotage, which carried a maximum 30-year 
sentence, but they had not actually committed any acts of sabotage.37 
Biddle, believing sabotage would not hold up at trial, limited the charges 
to conspiracy, which carried a two-year sentence and a fine.38 
Additionally, he might have been able to charge the men with a 
 
 25. Id.  
 26. Fisher, supra note 7, at 2.  
 27. Id.   
 28. Jacobson, supra note 13. 
 29. Fisher, supra note 7, at 2.   
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 5.  
 33. Jacobson, supra note 13. 
 34. Fisher, supra note 7, at 2.  
 35. Id. at 3.  
 36. Id .at 4.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
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violation of immigration laws.39   
As such, President Roosevelt commissioned a military tribunal to try 
the eight Nazis.40 The military tribunal allowed the Government to seek 
the death penalty. Additionally, the military tribunal could be held in 
secret, which was another win for the government. FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover used the media to create the false impression that the FBI used 
their superior detective skills to apprehend the Nazis.41 In federal court, 
the public would quickly learn of Coastguardsmen Cullen’s luck, the 
New York office’s incompetence, and Dasch’s aid in apprehending the 
Nazis.42 In military tribunal, the proceedings would be in secret, 
allowing the FBI to control the narrative.  
At the military trial, all eight Nazis were found guilty.43 The two 
defectors were sentenced to prison and hard labor, while the remaining 
six were sentenced to death by electrocution, which was carried out on 
August 8, 1942.44 Eight days prior to the executions, the Supreme Court 
issued a hasty per curiam decision ruling that the Military Commission 
was constitutional.45 Two and a half months after the executions, the 
Supreme Court supplemented their ruling in a long and confusing 
decision.46 
This decision—Ex Parte Quirin—opened the door to numerous 
questions about the power of the President, the reach of Congress, the 
constitutionality of military tribunals, the application of international 
law, and the very definition of war itself. Quirin, a long and rambling 
decision, left the door to interpretation wide open. It is through this door 
that Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul wished to have his conviction 
overturned.  
The following Casenote addresses the Constitutional issues raised by 
Bahlul following his conviction and sentencing by a military 
commission. Part II provides background on the creation of military 
commissions, on the defendant, Bahlul, and on the procedural posture of 
Bahlul’s case. Part III addresses Bahlul’s challenge of the military 
tribunals and the specific arguments presented by Bahlul and the 
Government. Part IV provides a summary of the two concurrences and 
the dissent in the D.C. Circuit Court’s per curiam opinion released in 
October 2016. Part V, the Discussion section, addresses a hypothetical 
 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 5.  
 41. Id. at 3.  
 42. Id. at 3.  
 43. Jacobson, supra note 13. 
 44. See generally Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).  
 45. Id.   
 46. Id.  
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posed by the dissent, proposes a new test for examining these types of 
cases, and applies this new test to the dissent’s hypothetical.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
This section addresses the history leading up to Bahlul’s challenge, 
including the actions of President George W. Bush and the United States 
Congress. Additionally, this section provides a brief history of Bahlul 
and the procedural posture of his challenges of the military tribunals.  
A.  Congress, the President, and the War on Terror  
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George 
W. Bush exercised broad authority to detain enemy combatants in the 
name of national security.47 President Bush’s decisions led to a 
significant political divide, with his opponents claiming the President’s 
actions were unconstitutional.48  Chief among the issues raised was the 
power of the President, and later the power of Congress, to create 
military tribunals to try suspected terrorists of war crimes.49   
President Bush issued an Executive Order on November 13, 2001, 
that allowed military tribunals to try non-American citizens accused of 
participating in or conducting terrorist acts.50  The President’s authoirity 
to commission military tribunals has long been a contentious and an 
uncertain area of constitutional law.51  The use of military tribunals has 
been traced back to both the Civil War and World War II.52  During the 
Civil War, military tribunals were used by President Lincoln to 
effectively and efficiently try Confederate soldiers.53  However, there 
was no constitutional challenge raised during the Civil War. Conversely, 
during World War II, this very issue was raised and litigated in Ex Parte 
Quirin, the case involving the Nazi saboteurs.  
As noted above, following the capture of the saboteurs, President 
Roosevelt commissioned a Military Tribunal to try the men.54 They were 
charged with the following crimes:  
 
 
 47. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 394 (5th ed. 
2015). 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.   
 50. Id. at 400.  
 51. Id. at 401.  
 52. Ali Hamza Ahmed Suliman Al Bahlul (Bahlul III) v. United States 840 F.3d 757, 759 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). 
 53. Id.   
 54. Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 401.  
5
Cotton: And the Congress Shall Have Power To...: The Implications of the
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
802 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
I. Violation of the law of war.  
II. Violation of Article 81 of the Articles of War, defining the 
offense of relieving or attempting to relieve, or corresponding with 
or giving intelligence to, the enemy.  
III. Violation of Article 82, defining the offense of spying.  
IV. Conspiracy to commit the offenses alleged in charges [I, II, and 
III].55  
 
Procedurally, the Supreme Court issued a short per curiam opinion, 
affirming the power and jurisdiction of the military tribunals.56  The men 
were tried and convicted, and six were executed.57  Two and a half 
months after the executions, the Supreme Court finally issued its full 
opinion. In the decision, the Court stated, “[b]y universal agreement and 
practice the law of war draws a distinction between…lawful and 
unlawful combatants.”58 In defining this distinction, the Supreme Court 
ruled that lawful combatants should be treated as prisoners of war, 
entitled to the full protections of a prisoner of war, while unlawful 
combatants were “offenders against the law of war subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals.”59  Of special interest was the Court’s 
decision not to define or decide the outer bounds of a military tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.60 Instead, they seemed satisfied with the ruling that lawful 
combatants were entitled to the laws of war while unlawful combatants 
could be tried by military tribunal. 
This obviously raises the difficult question of just how far the Quirin 
decision should reach. The question is left open as to whether Quirin is 
binding precedent or unique because, at the time, America was actually 
involved in a war declared by Congress. 
The issue of Quirin came to life again in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.61 In 
November of 2001, Salim Ahmed Handan, of Yemen, was captured in 
Afghanistan and later transferred to Guantanamo Bay.62 After a year in 
detention, Hamdan was tried by a military commission for “conspiracy 
to commit offenses connected with the attacks of September 11, 
2001.”63  Hamdan subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.64   
 
 55. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 605 (2006).  
 56. Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 410.  
 57. Id. at 401   
 58. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942).   
 59. Id. at 31; Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 401.  
 60. Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 401.  
 61. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 604 (2006).  
 62. Id. at 566. 
 63. Id.   
 64. Id. at 567.  
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In a 5-3 decision, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion found that “the 
military tribunals were not authorized by act of Congress and that they 
violated the Uniform code of Military Justice and the Geneva 
Conventions.”65 Specifically, Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions requires that the accused by tried in a “regularly constituted 
court.”66 As such, President Bush’s courts did not satisfy Common 
Article 3, and the conviction was vacated.67  For Hamdan to be properly 
tried, his hearing must occur before a “regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples”68 
In response to the Court’s decision, Congress enacted the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”), which “amended the statutory 
procedures governing military commission to cure the flaws identified 
in Hamdan.”69  Specifically, the Military Commissions Act enumerated 
thirty war crimes triable by military commissions.70 Moreover, it 
conferred jurisdiction on military commissions to try “any offense made 
punishable by this chapter or the law of war when committed by an alien 
unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September 11, 2001.”71  
B.  The Defendant, al Bahlul  
Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul is a native of Yemen.72 At some 
point in the late 1990s, Bahlul traveled to Afghanistan to join al 
Qaeda.73 While in Afghanistan, Bahlul trained with al Qaeda, eventually 
pledged a bayat (an oath of loyalty) to Osama bin Laden, and was 
assigned to work in the al Qaeda media and propaganda department.74  
Following the October 12, 2000, attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Bahlul 
created a video glorifying the attack to use as a recruitment tool.75 The 
video called for a jihad against America and blamed the West for 
Muslim problems in the East.76 The video was considered a successful 
recruitment tool and has been translated into several languages in an 
 
 65. Chemerinsky, supra note 47, at 402.  
 66. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631-32.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Bahlul v. United States (Bahlul I), 767 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2015).   
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.at 6-7.  
 72. Id. at 5.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 6. 
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attempt to expand al Qaeda recruitment.77 
Given the success of the video, Bahlul was promoted and became Bin 
Laden’s personal assistant and secretary of public relations.78  In this 
capacity, Bahlul arranged for the bayat and “martyr wills” of Mohamed 
Atta and Ziad al Jarrah, two of the 9/11 hijackers.79 Bahlul proudly 
proclaimed that he volunteered to participate in the 9/11 attacks himself, 
but was turned down by bin Laden because of his importance to the al 
Qaeda organization.80 
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Bahlul and bin Laden fled to a remote 
location in Afghanistan to await the results of their planned attack.81 In 
the weeks following 9/11, Bahlul again fled, this time to Pakistan where 
he was captured in December 2001 and turned over to U.S. Military 
forces.82 Bahlul was transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he 
was held as an enemy combatant pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for 
Use of Military Force.83 Bahlul was eventually charged with three 
crimes under the 2006 Military Commissions Act: (1) conspiracy to 
commit war crimes, (2) providing material support for terrorism, and (3) 
solicitation of others to commit war crimes.84  Specifically, “the 
conspiracy and solicitation charges allege seven object crimes 
proscribed by the 2006 MCA: murder of protected persons, attacking 
civilians, attacking civilian objects, murder in violation of the law of 
war, destruction of property in violation of the law of war, terrorism, 
and providing material support for terrorism.”85 
C.  Procedural Posture 
The path to Bahlul’s conviction is long and convoluted. But a 
summary of the procedural posture is appropriate. Bahlul was originally 
charged under President Bush’s military tribunals. However, Bahlul’s 
prosecution was stayed, awaiting a decision from the Supreme Court in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan and Congress’ 
enactment of the MCA, Bahlul’s charges were amended, and he 
 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.   
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 7. 
 85. See generally Samantha Sliney, U.S. v. Al Bahlul: Where It’s Been and Where It’s Going, 
Harvard Law School National Security Journal (March 22, 2016) (discussing the proceedings leading up 
to the decision of October 2016).  
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appeared before a military commission.86 A military commission 
convicted Bahlul of the three crimes listed above and sentenced him to 
life in prison.87  His conviction was reviewed by the United States Court 
of Military Commission Review (“CMCR”) and the conviction was 
upheld.88 
Following the decision of the Military Commission Review, Bahlul 
appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court (“Bahlul I”).89 In their first decision, 
the D.C. Circuit Court vacated Bahlul’s conviction based upon 
Hamdan.90 The government was granted a rehearing en banc and the 
court then affirmed Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction, vacating the other 
convictions, and remanding the remaining decision (“Bahlul II”).91  
On remand in Bahlul II, Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction was once 
again vacated with the court holding that “conviction of Bahlul for 
inchoate conspiracy by law of war military commission violated 
separation of powers enshrined in Article III.”92 The Government once 
again requested a hearing en banc and ultimately vacated the decision 
that vacated the conspiracy charge and scheduled another hearing 
(“Bahlul III”).93 
III.  BAHLUL’S CHALLENGE 
After vacating the June 2015 decision, the Bahlul III court requested 
that the sides address two questions: the proper standard of review and 
“whether the Define and Punish Clause of the Article I of the 
Constitution gives Congress power to define as an offense against the 
law of nations, triable before a law-of-war military commission, a 
conspiracy to commit an offense against the law of nations, to wit, a 
conspiracy to commit war crimes; and whether the exercise of such 
power transgresses Article III of the Constitution.”94   
Of importance to this decision are the Define and Punish Clause, the 
Declare War Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Define 
and Punish Clause reads, “[The Congress shall have the Power] . . . To 
 
 86. Id.  
 87. Bahlul v. United States (Bahlul I), 767 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015).   
 88. Id.   
 89. Sliney, supra note 85.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Bahlul v. United States (Bahlul II), No. 11-1324, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16967, at *1 (D.C. 
Cir. Sept. 25, 2015); While the D.C. Circuit Court did propose two specific questions, the first question 
remains outside the scope of this article. All of the Judges except for one, Judge Millet, agreed that the 
standard was de novo.   
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define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the High Seas, 
and Offenses against the Law of Nations.”95 The Declare War Clause 
reads, “[The Congress shall have the Power] . . . To declare War, grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on 
Land and Water.”96 Finally, the Necessary and Proper Clause reads, 
“[The Congress shall have the Power] . . . To make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”97 
All parties to the litigation agreed, the United States established 
military commissions in three wartime situations: (1) to operate as 
general courts in areas under martial law; (2) as general courts in the 
areas that the military temporarily occupies; and (3) to punish enemy 
belligerents who commit offenses against the laws of war during an 
armed conflict.98  Additionally, all parties agreed that Bahlul’s trial 
occurred under the third type of military commission.99 However, their 
disagreement occurred in the scope of that military commission’s 
jurisdiction.  
A.  The Government’s Argument  
The Government argued that international laws of war did not act as a 
constraint upon their authority to charge and convict prisoners of war.100 
In support of this position, the Government argued that it was within 
Congress’s authority to “authorize military commissions to try enemy 
belligerents for violations of the international laws of war as well as any 
other offenses Congress defines as violations of the ‘laws of war.’”101  
Essentially, the Government’s argument was that military commissions 
had the power to try international law of war offenses and Congress had 
the power to create separate and distinct causes of action for military 
commissions.  
In the alternative, the Government argued that a military commission 
might try an enemy belligerent for international law of war offenses, as 
well as “any offenses punishable under a ‘U.S. common law of war.’”102  
 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 10.  
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  
 97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  
 98. Ali Hamza Ahmed Suliman Al Bahlul (Bahlul III) v. United States, 840 F.3d 757,759 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016) 
 99. Id.   
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
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Though this assertion, the Government contended that military 
commissions had the power to try offenses listed in international laws of 
war and offenses that have been historically recognized at triable by 
military commissions, for which conspiracy would qualify. Specifically, 
the Government pointed to a case that was a main contention of this 
litigation: Ex Parte Quirin as well as some other historical analysis.103 
B.  Bahlul’s Argument  
Bahlul argued that the military commissions were only able to try 
offenses against the international laws of war.104 The challenged 
conviction—conspiracy—was not listed as an international law of war 
offense. In support of this argument, Bahlul relied heavily on the 
Hamdan decision.  
Additionally, Bahlul argued that acts created under the Define and 
Punish Clause were limited by international law.105 Specifically, Bahlul 
argued that “law of nations” was synonymous “international law” and, 
therefore, international law acted as a constraint upon the Define and 
Punish Clause.106  
III.  BAHLUL III 
A.  Kavanagh Concurrence  
The first concurrence, joined by Judges Henderson, Brown, Griffith, 
and Kavanagh would have upheld the conspiracy conviction as an 
offense triable by the military commission. In reaching this decision, the 
Kavanagh concurrence relied on historical standards: Congress twice 
passed the Military Commission Act, and both Presidents Bush and 
Obama signed the Military Commission Acts into law.107 
First, this concurrence addressed Bahlul’s argument that his 
conviction violated Articles I and III of the Constitution in that the 
military commissions could only try offenses written under international 
law.108 The concurrence began by calling this argument “extraordinary” 
because it “would incorporate international law into the U.S. 
Constitution as a judicially enforceable constrain on Congress and the 
 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 761. 
 106. Id. at 761.  
 107. Id. at 774. 
 108. Id. at 760.  
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President.”109 Essentially, the Kavanagh concurrence characterized 
Bahlul’s argument as attempting to enforce international law, that is not 
necessarily agreed upon through a treaty, on American military 
tribunals.110 
Kavanagh addressed the Article I issue first. Bahlul conceded that 
Congress does have the power to establish military commissions, 
however, he argued that these powers were limited only to offenses 
defined by international laws of war.111 Kavanagh pointed to five 
sources of law to support Congress’ authority to create military 
commissions and to define the offenses that they may try: (1) the text 
and original understanding of Article I, (2) the overall structure of the 
Constitution, (3) landmark Supreme Court precedent, (4) longstanding 
federal statutes, and (5) deeply rooted U.S. military commission 
practice.112 
In regard to the text and original understanding of Article I, Kavanagh 
asserted that the Define and Punish Clause, the Declare War Clause, and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause all worked together to give Congress 
the authority it needed.113 As noted above, the Define and Punish Clause 
gives Congress the power to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the 
Law of Nations.”114 Bahlul argued that “law of nations” was 
synonymous with “international law.”115 However, Kavanagh did not 
find this argument persuasive, stating “the premise of Bahlul’s Article I 
argument is flawed” because Article I authority is not found exclusively 
in the Define and Punish Clause.116  
Rather, Kavanagh found that the Declare War Clause “is understood 
by universal agreement and practice to encompass all of the traditional 
incidents of war – including the power to kill, capture and detain enemy 
combatants, and most relevant here, the power to try unlawful enemy 
combatants by military commission for unlawful war crimes.”117 
Because there is sufficient power found within the Declare War Clause, 
Kavanagh did not reach the issue of the scope of the Define and Punish 
Clause.118 
Second, Kavanagh addressed the structure and scope of the 
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Cir. Sept. 25, 2015).  
 115. Bahlul III, 840 F.3d at 761. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id.  
12
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/9
2018] IMPLICATIONS OF BAHLUL V. UNITED STATES 809 
Constitution itself. He stated, “[t]he Framers assigned the national 
government – in particular, Congress and the President – the authority – 
to make wartime decisions on behalf of the United States.”119 Kavanagh 
continued, “it would be a historical anomaly to conclude that ‘We the 
People of the United States’ gave foreign or international bodies the 
power to constrain U.S. war-making authority in that way.”120 
Turning now to the fourth reason, longstanding federal statutes, 
Kavanagh emphasized that “[b]eginning in 1776, the Continental 
Congress codified the offense of spying – a non-international-law of war 
offense – as a crime triable by military tribunal . . . [l]ikewise in 
September 1776, Congress authorized trial by military tribunal for 
another non-international-law offense: aiding the enemy.”121 
The third and fifth points, however, are where contention between the 
Kavanagh concurrence and the joint dissent arose. In regards to 
Supreme Court precedent, the Kavanagh concurrence cited primarily to 
Ex Parte Quirin.122 Specifically, the Kavanagh concurrence pointed to 
the fact that the Nazi saboteurs were tried and convicted of spying, 
which was not and has never been an international law of war offense.123 
However, the Kavanagh concurrence then focused on what the Quirin 
court did not say, rather than what they did say.124 Specifically, they 
pointed out that Quirin “did not say that military commissions are 
constitutionally permitted only for international law of war offenses. 
Nor did any later Supreme Court case hold that military commissions 
are constitutionally permitted only for international law of war offenses. 
One would have expected the Court at some point to say as much if the 
Court actually thought as much.”125 Essentially, the Kavanagh 
concurrence held that because the Quirin Court did not specifically state 
that international law was a constraint upon military commissions, it 
must not be. 
B.  Wilkins Concurrence  
Circuit Judge Wilkins wrote separately with a rather novel theory of 
this case. Essentially, Judge Wilkins found that Bahlul was not actually 
convicted of inchoate conspiracy but was, in fact, “convicted of an 
offense tantamount to substantive war crimes under a Pinkerton theory 
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of liability.”126 Wilkins found that international law recognized and 
applied a Pinkerton theory of liability with which Bahlul’s conspiracy 
comports. In fact, Judge Wilkins stated that if the separation of powers 
issue was presented in this case, he would be inclined to side with the 
dissent; however, he does not find a separation of powers issue at all.127 
First, Judge Wilkins defined inchoate conspiracy as “the darling of 
the modern prosecutor’s nursery” and that at its essence, conspiracy was 
“an agreement to commit an unlawful act.”128 The agreement itself 
satisfies the actus reas, and it is not necessary that the conspiracy 
actually succeed for the conviction to succeed.129 Moreover, many 
jurisdictions require “an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy but 
the overt act itself does not have to be unlawful.”130 As a stand-alone 
crime against the United States, conspiracy requires, “an agreement by 
two or more persons to commit an offense. The defendant must 
deliberately join the conspiracy with knowledge of this purpose. And 
one of the conspiracy members must, at some point during its existence, 
perform an overt act to further or advance the purpose of the 
agreement.”131  
In the alternative, under Pinkerton liability, a member to a conspiracy 
can be held liable for reasonable foreseeable crimes committed by others 
that are a part of the conspiracy.132 Under “a Pinkerton theory, a 
defendant’s responsibility to the underlying offense generally requires 
that the substantive offense be reasonably foreseeable and committed in 
furtherance of the conspiracy’s objectives, all while the defendant was a 
member of the conspiracy.”133 Essentially, the Wilkin’s concurrence 
would likely agree that inchoate conspiracy is far too broad to be tried 
by a military commission. However, Bahlul’s conviction much more 
closely resembled a Pinkerton conspiracy charge which has been 
recognized in international law.134 
First, Judge Wilkins pointed out that the MCA’s version of 
conspiracy very well may not reach the level of inchoate conspiracy. 
Judge Wilkins stated, “the statute specifically references victims, 
containing two sentencing variations depending on whether anybody 
dies as a result of the conspiracy . . . In other words, by conditioning 
punishment on either death or other harm befalling another person, the 
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MCA’s version of conspiracy contemplates the completion of a 
substantive offense.”135 The major distinction between inchoate 
conspiracy and a Pinkerton theory of liability is that inchoate conspiracy 
is achieved “even though the substantive offense is not successfully 
consummated.”136 Notably, there is a substantive offense completed in 
this case: the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.137  
Inchoate conspiracy jury instructions normally state that “the acts of 
co-conspirators can be considered proof of the conspiracy charge against 
the defendant.”138 However, this instruction or any similar instruction 
was not given in Bahlul’s military tribunal.139 In fact, the conspiracy 
instruction that was given in Bahlul’s trial required that the commission 
find that Bahlul “knowingly committed at least one of the following 
overt acts for the purpose of bringing about one of the objects of the 
agreement.”140 Judge Wilkins continued by explaining that Bahlul was 
on trial for ten specific findings regarding his own individual actions, 
not merely his membership in Al Qaeda.141 
Judge Wilkins opined, and Bahlul conceded, that the Pinkerton theory 
of liability did not violate the Constitution and that it was a recognized 
theory of vicarious liability in international law.142  In international law, 
this is called Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), and it occurs when there is 
a “common purpose to commit a crime where one of the perpetrators 
commits an act which, while outside the common purpose, is 
nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of 
the common purpose.”143 In fact, international tribunals have compared 
Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Pinkerton theory of conspiracy.144 
Specifically, one court stated, “[t]he standard itself for JCE III stems 
from the Pinkerton v. United States doctrine . . . . Indeed, even the 
language in Tadic is borrowed, from Pinkerton.”145 
Therefore, Judge Wilkins’s theory of the case was that Bahlul’s 
conviction must stand because he was convicted under a Pinkerton 
theory of conspiracy. Since this particular type of conspiracy is 
recognized in international law, there is no restrain on the conviction. It 
is important to note, however, that Judge Wilkins stated that he would 
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have likely agreed with the dissent if Bahlul was in fact convicted of 
inchoate conspiracy.  
C.  The Joint Dissent  
The joint dissent is divided into four parts. First, the joint dissent 
concurred in the de novo review of Bahlul’s case.146 Second, it 
addressed why the government’s argument fell short.147 Third, it 
addressed and countered particular arguments of the three 
concurrences.148 And fourth, the joint dissent addressed potential 
consequences of finding for the government.149 
Beginning with Part II of the opinion, the dissent addressed the 
Congressional ability to create limited exceptions to Article III courts, 
including the creation of military commissions.150 The dissent 
recognized three instances in which military commissions may be 
established: (1) to operate as general courts during martial law; (2) to 
operate as courts in areas in which the military currently occupies: and 
(3) to “punish enemy belligerents who commit offenses against the laws 
of war during an armed conflict.”151 The basis of the dissents argument 
is that the Congress’ creation of stand-alone offenses, including 
conspiracy, was unconstitutional under Article III.152  
Quickly summarized, the dissent’s position is that there are limited 
exceptions to Article III courts. One of those exceptions is for trying 
enemy belligerents who commit offenses against the laws of war but, 
under Quirin, this exception should be read narrowly to include only 
international law of war offenses.153 Since conspiracy is not an 
international law of war offense, Congress’s enactment of the offense is 
an unconstitutional infringement upon Article III.154  
In its interpretation of Quirin, the dissent asserted the Supreme Court 
found that “law of war” referred to “branch of international law,” and, 
therefore, the Quirin decision was based upon the Nazis’ violation of 
international law of war offenses.155 Therefore, the question in Quirin 
for the Supreme Court was whether or not the Nazis had “been charged 
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with a violation of the international rules governing armed conflicts.”156 
The dissent argued that the Court’s question was limited to this, and that 
the Supreme Court had decided that the actions of the Nazis constituted 
a violation of international law. Specifically, the dissent provided: 
 
Stating that the term “law of war” refers to a “branch of 
international law” the Court proceeded to consider whether the 
defendants had been charged with a violation of the international 
rules governing armed conflicts. [The Court] ultimately concluded 
that [the Nazis] had been, expressing its belief that passing behind 
enemy lines in civilian dress with the purpose of committing 
hostile acts was then an offense under international law.157  
 
To further support this theory, the joint dissent cited In re Yamashia 
and Johnson v. Eisentrager.  Both Yamashita and Eisentrager cited 
Quirin and in these decisions, the Supreme Court looked to international 
law to determine whether the charges violated the “law of war” or 
rather, “international law.” Specifically, Yamashita affirmed Quirin’s 
“governing principles.”158 Because the joint dissent determined that 
Quirin allowed only a limited exception to Article III courts, i.e., the 
exception in international law, and because conspiracy is not an 
international law of war offense, the conviction cannot stand.  
Moreover, the dissent did not find persuasive the Government’s 
argument that because conspiracy was not an international law of war 
offense at the time Quirin was decided, Quirin stands for the principle 
that Congress can enact defenses outside of international law.159 The 
dissent found that the Quirin court must have believed, albeit 
mistakenly, that conspiracy was an international law of war offense.  
Next, the dissent addressed the government’s argument that “Article 
III must be construed in light of Congress’s Article I powers and that 
those powers enable Congress to go beyond international law in 
determining the offenses triable by military commission.”160  
Essentially, the Government argued that Quirin and its progeny 
demonstrate that Congress derives its power to create military 
commission from the war powers.161 Therefore, the Government argued 
that Congress must also derive its power to list the offenses from the 
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War Powers Clause.162   
In contrast, the dissent opined that Quirin and its progeny only 
established Congress’s ability create military commissions. The 
jurisdiction which those commissions may exercise, however, is still 
limited by international law.  
Additionally, the dissent employed what is essentially a slippery slope 
argument, that if the conspiracy charge were allowed then there is no 
telling what else could be allowed next.163 The dissent pointed out that 
the Kavanagh concurrence would only allow for two constitutional 
constraints upon military commissions: “(1) that the individuals are 
‘enemy belligerents’ who (2) engaged in proscribed conduct ‘in the 
context of and associated with hostilities.’”164  The dissent continued: 
 
Critically, the government’s suggestion that the defendant’s status 
as an enemy belligerent in the context of hostilities suffices to 
subject him to trial by military commission ignores the Supreme 
Court’s focus on the offenses triable to law-of-war military 
commissions, in addition to the status of the offenders. Thus, the 
Court has focused on “the question whether it is within the 
constitutional power of the national government to place 
petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses 
with which they are charged.” In Quirin, the Court “assume[d] that 
there are acts” that could not be tried by military commission 
“because they are of the class of offenses constitutionally triable 
only by a jury.”165  
 
Thus, the dissent is concerned that focusing on the status of the 
offender, rather than the offense itself leads to ambiguities concerning 
how these cases will be handled in the future. 
V.  DISCUSSION 
Ultimately, the Bahlul per curiam encompassed four opinions, of 
which only the dissent decided the original issue regarding whether the 
Define and Punish Clause gives Congress the power to grant jurisdiction 
to military tribunals to hear the conspiracy charges, which the dissent 
answered in the negative. Both the Kavanagh concurrence and the joint 
dissent took hard-line positions, with little room for compromise. 
Kavanagh was concerned that overturning the conviction would 
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constrict Congress, and therefore the people Congress represents, to the 
mandates of international law. In Kavanagh’s view, the court does not 
even need to reach the extent of the Define and Punish Clause, because 
the Declare War Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause are 
enough to provide Congress with the requisite authority.  
In the alternative, Judge Rodgers’s dissent focused on the liberty and 
due process issues that would arise by finding for the government. The 
joint dissent posed the following hypothetical: 
 
Suppose, for instance, that the FBI launches an investigation into 
three lawful permanent residents who have lived in the United 
States since early childhood. Searching an apartment in Virginia 
that the three share, it discovers pipe bombs, al Qaeda propaganda, 
and a map of the Washington, D.C., metro system. The 
government arrests the three and wishes to prosecute them for 
conspiracy to kill innocent civilians. Under the government’s view 
of things, the Constitution would pose no bar to transferring the 
individuals into military custody and prosecuting them before a 
military commission.166  
 
Thus, if the analysis is limited to Kavanagh and Rodgers, the choices 
are rather stark and positional. Either we abdicate our Congressional 
decision-making powers to international law or we open ourselves to a 
world in which Congress has nearly unfettered power to try anyone as 
an enemy belligerent as long as they can be tied to the War on Terror.  
However, the choices need not be so grim. The possibility exists to 
satisfy the interests of the Government in utilizing Military 
Commissions while also guarding against the overreach that the dissent 
fears. First, the Discussion Section of this Casenote addresses the scope 
of the Define and Punish Clause. Next, this section addresses the 
dissent’s hypothetical, as if that hypothetical were to be decided under 
Kavanagh’s concurrence. Third, the Discussion Section will propose a 
new test for analyzing these issues. Finally, the Discussion section 
analyzes the dissent’s hypothetical once again; however, this time it will 
be analyzed under the proposed test.  
A.  The Scope of the Define and Punish Clause  
The Military Commissions Act derives its authority from the Define 
and Punish Clause. The Define and Punish Clause has not been 
specifically addressed by the Supreme Court. Lower courts have found 
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that international law acts as a constraint upon the Define and Punish 
Clause because the act of “defining” implies that the charge must 
already have been created.167 Thus, in their opinions, Congress can only 
“define” laws that are already a part of the “law of nations” or, in their 
opinion, “international law.”  
These courts do have a point: the power to define does not constitute 
the power to create. By its very definition, to define something is to 
provide a “statement of exact meaning” of something that is already in 
existence.168 In this, the lower courts are correct: Congress does not have 
the power to “create” offenses, only to define offenses and the 
appropriate punishments.  
However, where the courts are incorrect is in their interpretation of 
“Law of Nations.” If there is any international constraint upon Congress, 
it should only be on what they are restricted from doing. For example, if 
the United States entered into a treaty by which it was agreed that a 
conspiracy charge would violate international law of war principles, 
then Congress may be restricted. As the Kavanagh concurrence points 
out, it would be a historical anomaly to allow international law to act as 
a constraint upon the Congress and the President in making war-time 
decisions.  
Indeed, it would be rather ironic for the American People to fight the 
Revolutionary War, in large part because of a lack of representation 
from a far-off government, only to later concede to those governments 
the extent of power military commissions.    
If Congress can only “define” international laws, Congress could 
simply give every international law of war offense a definition so broad 
as to allow it to force anyone into a Military Tribunal. Additionally, at 
the time of the ratification of the Constitution, America was a small 
country with limited power in the international community, it is unlikely 
that the Framers intended to restrict Congress for years to come, based 
upon the decisions of the international community.  
B.  The Dissent’s Hypothetical Under the Kavanagh Concurrence 
The Kavanagh concurrence is so broad that any person could be 
forced into a military tribunal so long as they are: (1) an enemy 
belligerent and (2) they are engaged in proscribed conduct “in the 
context of and associated with hostilities.” In fact, the Government 
admitted as much during oral arguments. Under this interpretation, the 
dissent has a strong argument that a non-citizen resident could be forced 
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into a military commission.  
Historically, non-citizen residents are afforded protections under the 
Constitution.169 However, the broad interpretation of the Kavanagh 
concurrence would appear to limit those rights. Utilizing the dissent’s 
hypothetical, the three non-citizen lawful residents could be dragged 
into a military commission by only this minimum standard. The fact that 
the men were apparently involved with al Qaeda could fit them into the 
broad definition of “enemy belligerent.” Moreover, the evidence of pipe 
bombs and a map of Washington D.C. shows an “association with” 
hostilities.  
C.  The Courts should employ a new test for analyzing these charges. 
The issues raised by the scope of the jurisdiction of the Military 
Commissions Act forces us to rethink how we should go about 
answering these tough questions. The War on Terror is far from over 
and it is impossible to predict future conflicts. Therefore, we must either 
accept the overarching power of military commissions or constrain them 
within the confines of international law. However, there may be another 
way. This section proposes a new test for analyzing both the charges and 
the people brought before military tribunals. The goal of this test is to 
respect the precedent of Quirin and its progeny; to allow Congress to 
create charges for military commissions with only limited restrictions 
from international law; and to ensure protection from violations of due 
process as feared by the dissent. This new test consists of four parts, 
each of which is addressed below.  
1.  Is the charge brought by the military tribunal based upon an Act of 
Congress? If so, is the particular charge listed in the Act?  
Step One in this analysis is a simple cursory question that addresses 
the problem raised in Hamdan. Essentially, this step asks whether 
Congress has enacted a statute that would allow for the charges to be 
brought. If there is no statute, any conviction should be vacated and an 
analysis similar to the Supreme Court’s in Hamdan should begin.   
However, if there is an act of Congress, this step is not asking 
whether that Act is constitutional in and of itself. As with any Act of 
Congress, it might satisfy one test, but then be found unconstitutional 
under another. Additionally, this test asks whether or not the particular 
charge is enumerated in the Act. While this may seem obvious, it simply 
reinforces the fact that Congress must speak and do so with specificity. 
 
 169. See generally United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
21
Cotton: And the Congress Shall Have Power To...: The Implications of the
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
818 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
Under no circumstances should a military commission be authorized to 
create its own charges or act in complete independence of Congress. The 
parameters of the law and charges should be clearly defined. If there is 
an identifiable statute, and the charge in question is enumerated therein, 
the analysis should proceed to Step Two.  
2.  Is there a Constitutional Constraint upon the Charge, Conviction, or 
Jurisdiction?  
The second step of this analysis is meant to address the concerns of 
the dissent; specifically, the concern was about placing non-citizen 
residents or possibly even American citizens before a military tribunal if 
they pledge loyalty to a terrorist organization. The concern about 
dragging an American citizen into a military court has been addressed 
and resolved by the Supreme Court.170 It is well settled that American 
citizens, captured here or abroad, must be afforded due process of 
law.171  
However, the dissent raises an interesting question concerning non-
citizen residents. Under Kavanagh’s broad interpretation of 
Congressional power, it is quite possible that a non-citizen resident 
could be forced into military court if they were determined to be an 
enemy belligerent. However, adding a due process analysis resolves this 
issue. It has long been settled that non-residents living in the United 
States are afforded Constitutional rights and due process protections.172   
By adding this additional due process consideration, citizens and non-
citizen residents are distinguished and protected. If there is a 
constitutional constraint, the analysis should stop and the conviction 
vacated. If there is no constitutional constraint, the analysis continues to 
Step Three.  
3.  Is this particular charge or offense enumerated in international law of 
war or was the charge treated as an international law of war offense?  
The third step of this analysis follows the reasoning of Judge 
Wilkins’s concurrence. Although a specific offense may not be listed as 
an international law of war offense, it may very well fall within a 
broader definition of similar international law.  
As cited by the Kavanagh concurrence, the Supreme Court case 
United States v. Arjona, looked to international law for guidance, but did 
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not treat it as binding.173 Therefore, the courts should look for guidance 
from international law, but should not treat is as a means of binding 
Congress’s hands. A charge that can be found in international law serves 
to strengthen the government’s argument, but it is not dispositive. If a 
similar charge is found in international law, the analysis should stop and 
the conviction should be upheld. However, if there is not similar charge, 
the analysis continues to Step Four.  
4.  Does International Law act as a constraint upon the charge?  
The final step of this analysis requires the court to look to 
international law for specific restraints upon the charge or conviction, if 
any exist. It important to note that this analysis does not look to 
international law for permission, but rather for a restraint. In other 
words, courts should analyze whether there is a treaty or international 
agreement that would prevent the charge or conviction.  
For example, if the Geneva Conventions or other lawfully enacted 
treaties provide for a specific prohibition on the charge, Congress should 
be prevented from creating it. Hypothetically, if the United States 
entered into a treaty with another country wherein conspiracy was 
strictly prohibited as a military court offense, the statute or charge 
should be struck down or vacated.  
D.  The Dissent’s Hypothetical Under the New Test  
Returning now to the hypothetical proposed by the dissent, this new 
test will allow Congress and the military commission to exercise its 
power without infringing upon due process. As quoted above, this 
hypothetical involves three non-citizen residents who are arrested with 
pipe bombs, al Qaeda propaganda, and a map of Washington D.C. 
Assume that they are placed under the authority of a military tribunal, 
tried, and convicted. They appeal their decision to the military 
commission board, and their convictions are upheld. At this point they 
exercise their right under the MCA to appeal the D.C. Circuit Court.  
First, the court should determine whether or not there is an Act of 
Congress under which the defendants were charged. In this case, that 
would be the Military Commissions Act. As a part of this analysis, the 
court should also inquire whether the defendants were charged with a 
charge enumerated in the Act. Presumably they would be charged with 
conspiracy. Assuming the charge is enumerated in the Act, the analysis 
would advance to the next step.  
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Second, the court should ask whether there is a constitutional 
constraint upon charging these particular defendants. In this case, the 
defendants would argue—and the court should give great weight—the 
fact that they are non-citizen residents and are therefore protected by the 
Constitution and deserving of a trial by jury in an Article III court. 
However, this must be a heavy facts-and-circumstances analysis. If, for 
example, the non-citizen residents defected to a Middle Eastern country 
controlled by a terrorist organization for a period of time, received 
training, and then reentered the United States illegally, they may very 
well have forfeited their right to be heard in an Article III court. 
Alternatively, if they traveled to a Middle Eastern country for a short 
period before returning as a legal non-resident, they should still receive 
protection from the constitution and access to an Article III court.  
Recall the issue in Quirin, where eight Nazis entered the country 
illegally intending to do harm. In that instance, the Nazis were not 
legally allowed in the country and therefore did not avail themselves of 
the protections of an Article III court. Now imagine that the Nazis were 
legal non-residents who left America, received training in Germany, and 
then returned to America as legal non-residents. This case is somewhat 
more difficult, but the Nazis ultimately should still be afforded the right 
to be heard in an Article III court. The decision in this part of the 
analysis rests upon the defendants’ status at the time of the offense. If 
they were a legal non-resident at that time, they are afforded greater due 
process. However, if they were not a legal resident at the time of the 
offense, and they meet the criteria of being an enemy belligerent, the 
Government has the power to move the defendants into a military 
commission.  
Third, the court should ask if the charge can be found in international 
law. Here, the court should utilize a Wilkins analysis. If the defendants 
were charged with conspiracy and the burden of proof met by the 
government meets a Pinkerton theory of liability, the court should 
uphold the charge. Overall, the court should give deference to Congress 
and their ability to create charges and convict enemy belligerents. If the 
charge, or a similar charge, is not found in international law, Congress 
should not be totally restricted from creating the charge. However, the 
burden on the Government should be higher at this juncture.  
This is the great novelty of Judge Wilkins’s opinion. Judge Wilkins, 
rather than taking the defendant at his word, chose to fully analyze the 
actual charge leveled against the defendant and the standard for applying 
it. Given the limited facts of the dissent’s hypothetical, it appears the 
Government would not win on a charge of Pinkerton conspiracy. For 
Pinkerton conspiracy, there must be a completed act; here there is no 
completed act. Bahlul committed multiple acts in furtherance of the 
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conspiracy, to include traveling to Afghanistan to join al Qaeda, joining 
al Qaeda, pledging loyalty to al Qaeda, leading others to pledge loyalty 
to al Qaeda, acting as bin Laden’s personal secretary, preparing 
propaganda for al Qaeda, etc.174 
So assuming the actions of the three conspirators do not meet the 
definition of Pinkerton conspiracy, an inchoate conspiracy is not 
recognized by international law. This should not end the analysis. While 
it is certainly advantageous to find a similar law in the international 
community, it should not constrain Congress. However, if there is no 
similar charge in international law, the burden on the Government 
should be higher, especially in regards to the due process analysis and 
step four. Ultimately, the only constraint upon Congress should be what 
they cannot do, not what they can do.  
Finally, the court should look for any constraints by international law 
that would prevent the charge, conviction, or sentence. Specifically, the 
court should look to the Geneva and Hague Conventions to determine if 
international law prevents the charge. So long as there is no clearly 
defined prevention of the charge, Congress should have the power, 
under the Define and Punish Clause, to enumerate and enact the charges 
so long as due process is satisfied. In the dissent’s hypothetical, we do 
not know the specific charges levied against the defendants. Assuming 
that there is not international restriction, however, the charges should be 
upheld.  
Under the dissent’s hypothetical, the convictions would potentially be 
overturned after Step Two. If they were determined to have 
constitutional protections, the analysis should stop. However, this test 
would also allow Congress to retain its autonomy and utilize military 
commissions for the trial of enemy belligerents.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
If it did nothing else, the Bahlul per curiam showed the contentious 
nature of the issue of the military commissions. If we limit ourselves to 
the concurrences and the dissent in the Bahlul per curiam, the options 
appear relatively bleak.  
The truth of the matter is that military commissions have been used 
since the Civil War and the chances that Congress will move away from 
their use is slim at best. There is a chance that Bahlul will be heard by 
the Supreme Court in the next year. Should it be heard by the Supreme 
Court, we can only hope that the remaining questions about the Define 
and Punish Clause, the constraints of international law, and the true 
 
 174. Ali Hamza Ahmed Suliman Al Bahlul (“Bahlul III”) v. United States 840 F.3d 757, 777 
(D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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